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In Russia, market transition has led to sweeping structural changes: a long recession, growth of the private sector, expansion of certain branches of the economy and contraction of others, a decrease in average firm size, and regional differentiation in economic performance. These structural changes had important consequences for stratification through their effects on individual labor market outcomes. Analyses of nine types of individual labor market transitions in Russia using 1991-1997 workhistory data show that structural location has strong effects. Human capital and membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union also influence labor market prospects, but not in ways consistent with general theories about how market transition affects stratification processes. Structural change plays a key role in determining the impact of market reforms on stratification. But market transition produces variable patterns of structural change in different countries and in different regions within a single country. The structural perspective demonstrates why market transition has variable consequences for stratification: Different prior conditions and reform policies produce different patterns of structural change.
he transition from a state-administered to a market-based economy in Russia brought about rapid and far-reaching structural changes in the labor market. Institutional changes associated with the market reforms-the withdrawal of direct state control over the economy and the growth of pri-her labor market location-in a particular firm, branch of the economy, sector, and region-and varies over time.
The importance of these "structural" effects becomes clear in analyses of individual-level labor market transitions in Russia from 1991 through 1997, a period spanning the last year of the Soviet era and the first six years of the market transition era. Using new work-history data from a nationally representative sample, I estimate continuous-time hazard models showing the effects of individual-level characteristics and structural variables on the rates of three types of labor market transition: interfirm job shifts, intrafirm shifts, and involuntary job losses (layoffs). I also estimate logistic regressions to determine how the same variables influence the "quality" of job shiftsunderstood in terms of the sector, branch, and occupation of the destination job-conditional on a shift taking place.
The impact of structural change on stratification has received surprisingly little attention in the literature on post-socialist stratification. Instead, this literature has focused on returns to education and effects of membership in the Communist Party. Two dominant theories have proposed general accounts of how market transition influences these effects. According to "market transition theory" the spread of market institutions increases returns to human capital and decreases returns to political position, because markets reward productivity while state socialist institutions reward redistributive power (Cao and Nee 2000; Nee 1989 Nee , 1991 Nee , 1996 . "Power conversion theory" claims that Communist Party cadres use their superior positions within powerful networks to preserve, and even enhance, their material advantages after market transition (Bian and Logan 1996; Rona-Tas 1994; Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995) .
I also test for the effects of human capital and Communist Party membership on labor market transitions. Because neither market transition theory nor power conversion theory consistently predicts the empirical pattern of effects, neither offers a general account of how market transition shapes stratification. The reason they fail to do so becomes clear once we appreciate the important role of structural change in the labor market as a key mediating force that translates the institutional reforms of market transition into consequences for individual life chances. The particular pattern of recession and structural change accompanying market transition in Russia resulted not from any universal features of market (as opposed to state-administered) economies, but from the combination of market institutions with structural legacies inherited from the Soviet era and the particular policies implemented by Russia's reformers. These legacies and policies, in turn, reflect past government policies and more recent political struggles accompanying the reforms, which introduce contingency into the structural consequences of market transition in a particular country. Political struggles surrounding reform processes in Russia also directly affected stratification processes: Pressure on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union hurt the labor market prospects of its members during the final year of the Soviet Union's existence.
The contingent nature of the structural changes that accompany market transition in a given national context helps explain why the impact of market reforms on stratification cannot be deduced from ideal-typical conceptions of how markets operate (Gerber and Hout 1998; Walder 1996 Walder , 2002 ; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhou 2000). Even if markets-or, for that matter, elite networkshave certain generic features, their introduction will not have uniform effects on stratification processes in different countries. Cross-national variations in initial structural conditions, political circumstances, and policies lead to differences in the pace and pattern of structural changes following market reforms. Once we recognize that structural change directly influences life chances and interacts with individual-level traits, it becomes clear that the impact of market transition on stratification will vary. Even within a single national context, structural conditions can produce varying consequences in different sectors, branches, and regions. The relationship between market transition and stratification is thus a variable-varying both within and across national contextsto be explained based on institutional factors, political factors, and inherited structural legacies.
MARKET TRANSITION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN RUSSIA
"Structural change" refers to macro-level changes in the size of a country's work force and its distribution across sectors (private versus public), economic branches (manufacturing versus services), types of firms (large versus small), occupations (professional versus manual), and geographic locations (variation across regions and locality sizes). In stable capitalist societies, technological change, global competition, and shifting welfare state policies have brought about significant structural changes. These changes affect individual job mobility and employment exit patterns (and thus life chances) in ways that are predictable but not inevitable, and these effects vary by institutional regime (DiPrete 1993; DiPrete et al.
1997; DiPrete and McManus 1996; DiPrete and Nonnemaker 1997).
In Russia, a different set of factors led to far more dramatic and sweeping structural changes than those analyzed in the literature on Western capitalist societies. A series of radical institutional reforms effectively dismantled the system of far-reaching state control over the economy and led to the rapid rise of private ownership and marketbased allocation of resources and consumer goods. These institutional changes produced structural changes that, in turn, diversely affect the life chances of Russians differently located in the economic structure inherited from the Soviet era. To understand the impact of these structural changes on stratification in contemporary Russia and to draw the appropriate theoretical lessons, we must first consider their precise nature and why they took place. This requires a focus on the role that preexisting structural conditions and particular reform policies-rather than market institutions as such-have played in shaping the specific structural changes that market transition produced in Russia.
STRUCTURAL DISTORTIONS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY
Five characteristics of the Soviet economy are especially relevant for understanding the structural changes that followed market reforms (e.g., see Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse 1997; Hewett 1988 Market transition involves both property reform and liberalization (the withdrawal of state control over the economy). Introduced in the structural conditions of Russia, these processes redistributed jobs from the state sector to the private sector, from manufacturing industries (especially defense and heavy industry) to services and finance, and from large to small and medium-size enterprises. They also led to a greater differentiation of economic performance and labor market conditions across Russia's regions. Finally, they produced sharp growth in unemployment.
RUSSIAN REFORM POLICIES: RADICAL LIBERALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION
Market transition can be implemented at different speeds and through a wide variety of policies. In China, the process was gradual for the first two decades of reform and has not involved substantial political reforms. Large-scale privatization began only in the mid-1990s and has mainly affected new public firms in rural areas. In most countries of East Central Europe, reforms have been much more rapid and have included both privatization and dramatic change in political institutions. Each case of market transition unfolds according to a different blueprint, and the actual policies adopted result from often contentious political processes (Stark and Bruszt 1998) .
In August 1991, the tense political atmosphere following the defeat of an attempted coup by hard-liners prompted reformers in Yeltsin's regime to adopt a radical approach. They were influenced by neoliberal arguments and feared that gradual measures would be easily reversed should conservative forces gain the upper political hand. The government's package of "shock therapy" measures in January 1992 abruptly eliminated controls on wages, prices, trade, currency exchange, and ownership of productive assets, along with state planning agencies, and mandatory state orders (Aslund 1995; Blasi et al. 1997 ). Large-scale privatization of medium and large state firms began in earnest in December 1992 (small firms were privatized in early 1991).
These reforms explicitly sought to transform the labor market. One goal was to make the labor market more flexible.1 To this end, mandatory job assignments for graduates with higher or specialized education were eliminated, unemployment benefits and employment services were established. But more important, liberalization and privatization were to spur a massive reallocation of labor from inefficient to productive firms, branches, and sectors. Freed from centrally established wages, promotion schedules, and suppliers, but facing foreign competitors, dwindling state orders, and shrinking subsidies, managers now had the flexibility and the incentives to restructure their product lines and workforces in response to market signals. Initially, unemployment would rise steeply, as inefficient enterprises shut down and successful enterprises shed excess labor. But after the initial shock of liberalization, gains from foreign investment, market incentives, and increased productivity would fuel growth.
The reforms did not remove all obstacles to labor market flexibility because of continuing political conflicts. Some enterprises 1 The Soviet labor market was formally flexible in that workers were free to change jobs if they wished. But informal policies and institutions promoted lifelong employment within a single organization (see Clarke Sapir 1999 ). The prior structural distortions in Russia were more extreme than in other countries, which would have necessitated a more thorough macroeconomic adjustment even in the best of circumstances. Political conflicts led to inconsistent policies and weakened Russia's emergent state and legal institutions. In turn, ineffective, unstable state institutions encouraged corruption, asset-stripping, rent-seeking, and speculation, while discouraging the restructuring and investment needed for growth. Certain exchange rate, trade, and taxation policies also slowed Russia's recovery. Russia's recession contrasts starkly with the strong growth experienced in China after the introduction of market reforms. Obviously, neither growth nor recession follows inevitably from market transition; where recession ensues, its length can vary considerably. The outcome depends on the preexisting structural conditions and the set of policies followed in a particular country.
Official data also testify that privatization and the ascendancy of market forces over planners' priorities led to the expected changes in the sector and branch structure of the economy (Goskomstat Rossii 1999). From 1991 to 1997, private-sector employment in Russia grew from 13 percent to 40 percent of total employment. Employment grew steeply in the areas of trade/catering (55 percent), finance/insurance (77 percent), and public administration (68 percent) and modestly in housing/communal services (6 percent) and health (2 percent). Employment declined in all other branches, most precipitously in the previously bloated manufacturing (-35 percent) and construction (-33 percent) branches, and in education and science (-17 percent). Growing variation in branch performance also increased the interbranch standard deviation in mean wages by 40 percent from 1992 to 1997. Employment in large-and medium-size enterprises declined more rapidly than overall employment (Clarke 1999), implying a drop in average firm size.
Finally, during Russia's market transition, regional disparities in economic performance also increased. This reflects regional differences in comparative advantages inherited from the Soviet era (when regional growth patterns, investment, and industry mixes were determined by the strategic priorities of the Soviet state rather than market forces), the retreat from redistributive policies by the central government, and the decline of centralized authority over the regions ( (Clarke 1999 ) between the Soviet and postSoviet periods. These studies capitalize on the richness of their survey data to shed light on job search processes from the perspective of both employees and employers. But their results cannot be generalized to other sectors, economic branches, and regions. Only multivariate analyses of broadly representative work-history data can answer the key question for stratification: How do the structural changes influence the labor market prospects of different groups of Russians? Such analyses must be guided by hypotheses regarding the effects of both structural and individual-level variables derived from previous research on structural change and labor market transitions and theories of market transition.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES STRUCTURAL EFFECTS: EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS
As the consequences of reform course through different parts of the economy and regions of the country at different speeds, they produce variation in economic and institutional conditions across employing organizations (firms), localities, and time. This variation, in turn, potentially affects individuals' labor market risks and opportunities, as manifested in labor market transition rates. I begin with employer characteristics, emphasizing sector (property form) and branch.
I deduce "push" effects of employer characteristics from positive effects on interfirm mobility, job loss, and shifts to low-quality jobs.2 Workers are more likely to take on a low-quality job to the extent they are driven out of their current job by unfavorable firm characteristics. Favorable firm characteristics should exert "retention" effects, evident in higher rates of shifts to high-quality jobs. Intrafirm mobility can result from push effects (necessitating workforce reorganization) or retention effects (fostering promotions), but in the recessionary context of Russia the former are more likely.
Property form represents one firm-level characteristic whose variation has clear theoretically based implications for labor market transitions. Kornai's (1981) influential analysis links state property with soft budget constraints, which encourage managers to hoard and squander labor resources. In contrast, competition and hard budget constraints compel managers of private firms to economize on labor costs and improve productivity. Russian market reformers concurred: Privatization of state-owned firms would restore economic efficiency and growth because profit-seeking owners of private firms would restructure output and labor in more productive, efficient directions (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1995; Sachs 2 I hereafter abbreviate "conditional odds of shifts to high-(low-) quality jobs" as "shifts to high-(low-) quality jobs." Readers should bear in mind that this refers to the odds that a shift is to a high-(low-) quality job, conditional on a shift occurring. Apart from property form, a variety of other branch characteristics should also affect individual labor market transitions-for example, product market characteristics, concentration, average firm size, and labor intensity (Hachen 1992) . Russian data lack information on these characteristics, however, so I focus on branch performancemeasured by wage levels and employment change-as the other key branch-level variable. Recall that the combination of economic liberalization with Soviet-era investment priorities produced divergent fortunes in various branches. Wages and employment both tend to decline in poorly performing branches and increase in successful branches (although the relationship is not exact, as wages remain low in trade/catering despite its rapid growth). High wages retain workers; employment contraction implies many firm exits in the form of interfirm shifts, quits, and layoffs ( Sector and branch are the most important, but not the only, readily measurable employer traits, in terms of effects on labor market transitions. Firm size is another relevant characteristic. Large firms tend to retain workers because they are likely to have internal labor markets and are better able to ride out cyclical downturns in the external environment (Carroll and Mayer 1986 ). Moreover, average firm size has fallen steadily in post-Soviet Russia. But considerations of space dictate treating firm size as a control variable here.
STRUCTURAL EFFECTS: LOCATION AND TIME
While firm-level variables influence labor market transitions through "push" effects, regional characteristics exert "pull" effects-they determine the availability of jobs of varying quality outside the firm. Regional property composition and regional economic performance are the aspects of regional variation that should matter most for labor market transitions. Just as penetration by market institutions (private property) varies across firms and branches, so it does across regions. Market reforms, at least in the plans of reformers, are associated with more active labor markets and the growth of opportunities:
Hypothesis 5: Greater penetration of private property in a region increases interfirm shift, layoff, and high-quality shift rates; decreases rates of low-quality shifts.
Independent of institutional change, the regional variations in economic performance due to Soviet legacies described earlier should also influence individual labor market transition rates. Poorly performing regions-those with low mean real wages and high unemployment-should offer fewer opportunities outside one's firm, and vice versa:
Hypothesis 6: Better regional economic performance (high wages, low unemployment) increases interfirm and high-quality shift rates; decreases job loss and low-quality shift rates. The SEIAR included a battery of questions that allowed me to construct a complete work/employment history for each respondent since December 1990, including all 5 Details regarding sampling frame; selection of primary sampling units, secondary sampling units, and households; refusal rates; quality control; and specific wording of questions are available in the documentation accompanying the data file (Gerber 1999 ). This can be downloaded from http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
6 I calculated post-sampling weights to reproduce in the sample the relative cell frequencies in the four-way cross-classification of birth cohort, education, gender, and type of residence (urban versus rural) reported in the 1994 Russian micro-census. All analyses reported below are based on the weighted sample (N = 3,238). Weighting reduces the sample size because Russians over age 60, who are excluded from my analyses, were undersampled and thus generally received weights above unity. spells of employment, unemployment, and separation from the labor force. Some histories are missing information on certain jobs. For the 14 respondents who changed jobs more than four times in the period analyzed, the missing data resulted from the fact that details were collected on a maximum of four new jobs held since 1990. Other respondents simply neglected to provide some information. Rather than exclude respondents or spells with missing job characteristics, I assigned valid zeros (for nominal variables) or sample means (for continuous variables) on the missing variables for the relevant spells and included dummy variables indicating missing data in the models to avoid influencing the parameter estimates with these substitutions.
OUTCOMES
I estimate continuous-time competing-hazard models of three labor market transitions: interfirm job shifts, intrafirm job shifts, and job loss.7 The risk set for these events during month t consists of all 18-to-60-yearolds with completed education, working for hire, and not on maternity leave. Respondents are added to the risk set as they turn 18, complete their education, return from maternity leave, or enter hired employment.8 They leave when they exit hired employment or turn 61. Respondents who change jobs remain at risk for all three outcomes.
I also estimate models of the quality of job shifts. To ensure that the effects of covariates on the quality of job shifts do not merely reflect their effects on overall job mobility rates, which could be the case if unconditional hazard models are used, I estimate binary logistic regression models, each conditional on a job shift having taken place. Four destinations imply "high-quality" shifts: (1) new private and (2) privatized firms (where earnings are higher by net factors of 1.86 and 1.73, respectively, in the 7 Entry to self-employment is analyzed with the SEIAR data in Gerber (2001a). 8 The survey did not determine when women returned from maternity leave, so I treat all maternity leave spells as lasting for nine months. This introduces measurement error of unknown magnitude and consequence. SEIAR data), (3) a high-wage branch, and (4) a higher-earning occupation. Two destinations imply "low-quality" shifts: (1) a low-wage branch and (2) a lower-earning occupation.
High-wage branches are defined as having mean wages at least one-quarter of a standard deviation above the mean for all branches (based on data from Goskomstat Rossii 1999): extraction, construction, transport/communications, and finance/insurance. Because the distribution is negatively skewed, low-wage branches are defined more restrictively as having mean wages one-half a standard deviation below the mean for all branches: agriculture, trade/catering, health/social services, education/science, and culture/entertainment. To measure occupational earnings mobility, I scaled four-digit occupation codes from the 1988 version of the International Standard Classification of Occupations according to the standardized mean earnings of respondents in the corresponding occupations in nine Russian surveys spanning February 1992 to March 2000 (valid N = 12,023). A higher-(lower-) earning destination occupation is defined as having at least one fifth of a standard deviation higher (lower) on this scale than the origin occupation.
The conditional logit models for transition to a new private, privatized, high-wage branch, and low-wage branch firms are estimated on the sample of interfirm shifts. The models for upward and downward earnings mobility are estimated on the sample of all job shifts, excluding those for whom the relevant type of mobility is impossible because of ceiling or floor effects.
MODELS
To test the hypothesized interactions and assess alternative patterns of change over time (in effects and in the baseline hazard), I estimate a series of models for each outcome in four distinct steps. In step 1, I estimate a baseline model including only the main effects of individual and contextual traits and, to flexibly represent change in the baseline hazard without imposing a priori a particular functional form, dummy variables for each year of the observation window (following 1991, the omitted year). I include ex-perience-squared in the baseline only if it significantly improves overall model fit.9
In step 2, I use likelihood-ratio tests to assess, one at a time, the hypothesized interactions between human capital and locational traits (Hypotheses 9 and 10). Prior to step 3, I estimate a new baseline model adding those interactions that are significant to the original baseline model.
In The theoretical centrality of change over time and theoretical uncertainty regarding its precise pattern warrant testing such a variety of specifications off(y). But I risk capitalizing on chance, so any interactions detected should be viewed as provisional until replicated with other data. On the other hand, if none of the f(y) significantly improves model fit, I can be confident that the effect is temporally stable.
9 I also tested a woman x experience interaction for each outcome, but it was never statistically significant.
10 In fact, the log-quadratic function is extremely flexible and can also readily capture accelerating positive or negative effects depending on the parameter values. Note that log(y + 1) equals 0 for 1991, as do y2 and y > 0.
Step 4 11 In cases where the log-quadratic specification fits best, there are two corresponding 3j, Ok, or fr-one for log (y + 1) and one for y2.
12 Modeling steps are illustrated in Appendix Table A-1, which shows fit statistics for some of the models estimated for interfirm shifts. Complete fit statistics are available from the author upon request.
(1) firms (wholly owned by individuals or foreign firms) and "privatized" firms (jointstock companies with majority ownership in the hands of the work collective or nonstate entities). A dummy variable for collective farms is also entered. The omitted category, state-owned firms, includes partially privatized firms (where the state owns the majority of shares), as well as firms owned by federal, regional, or local authorities.
High-wage and low-wage branches (specified with dummy variables), branch employment change, and the percentage of private sector employees in each branch category are all determined from official sources (Goskomstat Rossii 1999). Annual regional characteristics are from official data (Goskomstat Rossii 1998) on Russia's oblasts, territorial units equivalent to American states. Regional economic performance is measured by the annual mean wage (in thousands of regionally adjusted 1991 rubles) and the end-of-year unemployment rate (imputed for 1991).13 Published regional data on the extent of regional penetration by private property prior to 1995 are lacking. So I computed a "services" index-the ratio of value of services delivered to the total value of services, industrial production, and agricultural production-as a proxy for the advance of private property over the full period under study.14 Education is measured using dummy variables for the key levels of educational attainment in the Soviet/Russian system (see Gerber 2000b): college degree, specialized secondary school, lower vocational school, and less than secondary. The baseline is general secondary school. Mutually 13 The survey sampled 41 of Russia's 89 oblasts. Because the data contain only the respondent's place of residence at the time of the survey, I must assume that no respondents changed city or oblast since 1990. This introduces measurement error of unknown magnitude into estimates of the regional parameters, even though regional mobility is relatively rare in Russia.
14 For 1995 and later years, the services index is highly correlated with the percentage employed in privately-owned firms, percentage employed in small businesses, and number of privatized firms, suggesting it is a good proxy for regional penetration of private property. exclusive dummy variables indicate Communist Party "cadre" status (administrative position in the Party) and "rank-and-file" membership.
Control variables include workforce experience, a dummy variable for women, logged firm size, logged size of locality of residence, a dummy variable indicating residence in Moscow, a dummy variable for job tenure less than one year, and, in models for occupational earnings mobility, occupational earnings. I also include dummy variables for defense-industry, agriculture, and trade/catering to deal with potential idiosyncracies involving these branch categories. All continuous variables are centered at their annual means (for variables from official data) or their sample means (for variables from the survey) to permit meaningful interpretations of changes in baseline hazards or log-odds.
RESULTS
First I present the descriptive statistics. Then, my exposition proceeds through the series of hypotheses developed above. For each set of hypotheses, I discuss the relevant coefficients from the preferred models for each outcome. For each set of coefficients, only significant effects are presented in the tables. To facilitate interpretation of significant interaction effects involving time, I provide computations of all effects for five of the seven years in the period under study. All parameter estimates, standard errors, and other information from the preferred models are to be found in Appendix Table A-2.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Descriptive statistics for key variables imputed at annual or semiannual intervals from January 1991 through January 1997 reveal that the SEIAR data capture key changes of the transition era (see Table 1 ). Employment share declined sharply in manufacturing and the primary sector, and grew vigorously in trade/catering, financial services, and public administration. These patterns and the annual distributions of employees across branches are all consistent with official data, suggesting the survey data are sound. The spread of private prop- There is only one firm-level property effect consistent with Hypothesis 3: Employment in a privatized firm initially lowers the exposure to job loss, but the effect reverses direction by 1997. As anticipated, privatization eventually creates an impetus for restructuring at the firm level, but only after a delay, during which governance issues are clarified and cultural and political impediments to market incentives are surmounted. In sum, the results show tendencies of segmentation and preliminary evidence that privatization eventually encourages micro-level restructuring. But otherwise, property reform at the firm level has few of the push effects expected by the reformers.
At the branch level, however, private property has important effects consistent with Hypothesis 2. The degree of branchlevel privatization increases the rates of interfirm shifts and job loss, suggesting push factors are at work. It also increases the (conditional) rates of shifts to new private firms (over time), privatized firms (to a diminishing extent of time), and, for workers with less than a secondary education, to higher-earning occupations. Other effectsincreased intrafirm shifts and decreased shifts to low-wage branches-are not consistent with the push effects specified by Hypothesis 2. But the overall pattern does suggest that managers of firms in organizational fields that have been more thoroughly penetrated by private property are more likely to adopt the restructuring practices associated with private ownership-net of the (weak or nonexistent) effects of firm-level property type.
The signature institutional change associated with market transition-the spread of private ownership-has stronger effects at the contextual (branch) level than at the micro (firm) level. The branch-level effects tend to be stable over time, contrary to Hypothesis 3. But increasing interbranch variance in the extent of privatization (see Table  1 ) implies growing divergence of labor market outcomes due to this source of institutional change.
Branch performance clearly affects labor market transitions in contemporary Russia. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, branch contraction pushes workers out of firms: It increases the risk of job loss and increases internal mobility rates, reflecting, most likely, the reconfiguration of workforces within firms undergoing down-sizing (DiPrete 1993). Branch contraction has no net effect on the interfirm shift rate: Russian firms facing difficult product market conditions rely on layoffs more than attrition to economize on labor costs. Also consistent with Hypothesis 4, branch expansion increases shifts to privatized firms and high-wage branches (for those with less than college and less than high school education, respectively). Only the negative effect of expansion on shifts to new private firms runs counter to Hypothesis 4.
Also consistent with Hypothesis 4, highwage branches retain employees: Those in high-wage branches have lower rates of interfirm mobility, shifts to lower-earning occupations, and shifts to low-wage branches, as well as much higher odds of shifts to high-wage branches. Employees of firms in low-wage branches are pushed out: They have higher rates of interfirm mobility and shifts to low-wage branches, lower rates of 
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Note: All coefficients shown are significant at the p < .05 level or better. a Effect applies only to those with less than a secondary school education; no effect for those with at least secondary school.
b Shows the effect of one percentage-point difference. c The effect applies only to those with a college degree; no effect for those with less than college. d Shows the effect of a one-percent increase. Note: All coefficients shown are significant at the p < .05 level or better. a Effect applies only to those with less than a secondary school education; no effect for those with at least secondary secondary school.
b Effect applies only to those with a college education; no effect for those with less than college. c Shows the effect of an increase of ten 1991 rubles. d Shows the effect of a one percentage-point increase.
intrafirm mobility and shifts to high-wage branches. Net of the other branch measures, branch wage level does not affect job loss rates. The higher rates of mobility within both branch-wage types is another form of segmentation with consequences for stratification: Part of the workforce is confined to moribund branches and has difficulty escaping to flourishing branches, where another part of the workforce is well-ensconced.
STRUCTURAL EFFECTS:
REGION OF RESIDENCE AND TIME Despite the error built into the regional measures (some respondents may have changed regions during the observation period), we find a number of statistically significant regional effects. Refer to Table 3 . The effects of the spread of private property at the regional level are ambiguous with respect to Hypothesis 5, which associates the regional penetration of market forces with greater labor market opportunities outside the firm. Consistent with this expectation, residents in regions with high values on the services index experience more frequent shifts to privatized firms (for those with at least a high school education) and to high-wage branches, and less frequent downward occupational mobility. Contrary to Hypothesis 5, they also experience lower interfirm shift rates (if they have less than a high school education) and higher job loss rates (if they have a college degree). Consistent with Hypothesis 6, high wage levels in a region are associated with increased interfirm mobility and, not surprisingly, fewer shifts to lower-earning occupations. Higher regional unemployment increases exposure to job loss (reflecting the lower availability of jobs in other firms to soak up laid-off workers) and, for the least educated, lowers opportunities for movement to a higher-earning occupation and increases shifts to low-wage branches. Regional unemployment also has two effects that contradict Hypothesis 6: It raises the odds of a shift to a privatized firm and, for those with secondary schooling or college, reduces the odds of a shift to a low-wage branch. These initially counterintuitive results can be explained. Unemployment is higher in more heavily industrialized regions, and industrial firms are most subject to privatization. Thus the unemployment rate probably captures the availability of jobs in privatized enterprises that is not captured by the services index. Also, more jobs have been created in the low-wage trade/catering/services branch than in any other, so lower unemployment in a region suggests greater development of this branch there. Otherwise, all the significant effects of regional economic performance on labor market transitions are consistent with Hypothesis 6.
Given the poor quality of the regional measures, it is striking that the models revealed any significant regional effects at all. Despite some ambiguity in the pattern of effects, the results confirm that there is an important regional component to the structural changes that have shaped labor market outcomes in Russia. Further research with improved measures is needed to shed more light on the contours of this dimension.
Turning to change over time, the results strongly support Hypothesis 7. All the baseline hazards/odds increased over time, except for the hazard of internal mobility and the conditional odds of a shift to low-wage branch firm. Because the regional and branch-level measures are all centered at their annual means, these shifts in the baselines capture the global effects of structural changes accompanying market transition. The various effects-the rise of private property, institutional instability, macroeconomic recession, and so on-cannot be disentangled because they strongly covary over the period in question. These macro-level changes clearly made the Russian labor market more active (increased interfirm mobility) and more perilous (sharply increased job loss, modestly increased downward mobility). At the same time, they increased access to the private sector and, perhaps surprisingly, to high-wage branches (at least during the mid-1990s) and higher-earning occupations. The overall picture is mixed: Market transition has brought great risks, but also has brought some opportunities. How do human capital and Communist Party membership affect the balance of risk and opportunity?
HUMAN CAPITAL EFFECTS
For individuals, a college education provides several stable labor market advantages during the course of Russia's transition: more intrafirm shifts (presumably, promotions), more shifts to privatized firms, more upward mobility and less downward mobility in terms of occupational earnings, and, generally, fewer shifts to low-wage branches (see Table 4 ). Those with the least education have consistently fewer shifts to better-paying occupations and to new private firms. On the other hand, the college-educated change firms at a lower rate and also have far fewer shifts to new private firms, where earnings are highest. Thus, a college education is not an unambiguous source of labor market opportunity.15 But more important for assessing market transition theory are changes over time (Hypothesis 8) and variation across sector and branch (Hypothesis 9) in the effects of education. Here I find a number of significant interaction effects, which further testify to the importance of structural variables in shaping labor market outcomes in the course of market transition. But I find no consistent pattern regarding the predictions of market transition theory. Consistent with Hypothesis 8, as market transition progresses, college education comes to provide considerable insulation from layoff. But in any given year a college education is less of an advantage in this respect the greater the degree of branch-level and regional-level privatization, which contradicts Hypothesis 9.
At the other end of the spectrum, over time those with less than secondary school have less internal mobility and fewer shifts to privatized firms-both consistent with 15 To illustrate the magnitude of the interactions between structural variables and education, Table 4 presents the relevant effects calculated at the annual means for the relevant structural variable (which, because they are all annually mean-centered, is always equal to the main effect) and at one 1994 standard deviation above the mean on the structural variable (for 1994 standard deviations, see Table 1 ). The effect at one 1994 standard deviation below the mean on the structural variable can be obtained by taking the reciprocal of the "one 1994 standard deviation above" effect.
Hypothesis 8. But their interfirm shift rate grows steadily, and their relative exposure to downward occupational earnings mobility decreases starting in 1995, after an initial upswing. Regional-level privatization decreases their interfirm shift rate and their (relative) access to privatized firms, while employment in a new private firm magnifies their exposure to movement down the occupational earnings scale-all consistent with Hypothesis 9. But branch-level privatization diminishes their relative disadvantage regarding the odds of shifting to a better-paying occupation. Altogether, then, it is quite clear that structural variation in the degree of market penetration affects the magnitude of the advantages associated with education, but not in a manner consistent with the predictions of market transition theory.
Although many interactions between other structural aspects of location (branch and regional performance and firm size) and human capital are not significant, those that are tend to support Hypothesis 10. Russians with less than a secondary school education are more hurt by regional unemployment (lower relative odds of internal mobility and upward occupational mobility, higher mobility to low-wage branches) and by branchlevel contraction (lower mobility to highwage branches) than are those with a high school education or more. Branch contraction enhances the relative advantage of college education for shifts to privatized firms (as implied by the smaller college coefficient for expanding branches). On the other hand, firm size affords protection from layoff only to those with less than secondary school, and also decreases the odds of shifts to low-wage branches for those with less than a college education.
MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY
Nearly all of the effects of Communist Party membership vary over time, in some cases sharply (see Table 5 ). Confirming Hypothesis 12, the clearest expression of the direct impact of political struggles on stratification processes, the results show that 1991 was a bad year for Communist Party members, but membership became an advantage thereafter. In 1991, Party members had substantially higher job loss rates and lower rates of job mobility. Rank-and-file members had much higher conditional rates of shifts to lowwage branches and lower-earning occupations. The parameter estimates are similar for cadres, but the effects are not significant, probably because of the small number of cadres in the sample. After 1991, Communist Party membership became associated with better labor market prospects, as predicted by Hypothesis 1 la: lower rates of job loss (for most of the period 1992-1997) and, for rank-and-file members, lower rates of shifts to low-wage branches (from 1993 to 1996). Confirming Hypothesis lib, both cadres and rank-and-file members had higher intrafirm mobility from 1992 onward, providing evidence that selection contributes to the advantages of Party members.
Not all effects are consistent with a Communist Party advantage: Both cadres and rank-and-file members have higher conditional rates of downward occupational earnings mobility throughout the period, and rank-and-file members have less access to jobs in privatized firms from 1992 onward. But the downward occupational mobility must not be overemphasized, as in the SEIAR data, the occupational earnings scale-the basis for defining upward and downward occupational mobility-explains only 24 percent of the variance in earnings. This is a substantial proportion, given that occupation is often portrayed as a weak predictor of earnings in Russia (Clarke 1999) . But it leaves a fair amount to be explained by other variables. Moreover, former cadres earn 29.3 percent more, and rank-and-file members 15.9 percent more, than nonmembers, net of occupational earnings.
CONTROL VARIABLES: GENDER, WORK-FORCE EXPERIENCE, AND FIRM SIZE
The control variables generally have predictable effects (see Appendix Table A -2), but three variables deserve brief comment. The preferred models show that Russian women face significantly worse labor market prospects in the period of market transition than do men with the same traits and structural position. Women have lower interfirm mobility than men, higher exposure to lowquality shifts, and lower rates of high-qual-ity shifts. Preliminary analyses revealed some interesting patterns of variation in the gender effects over time and by education. Gender differences in the impact of market transition on labor market transitions in Russia are sufficiently important and complex to merit a separate analysis.
Workforce experience, an aspect of human capital generally overlooked in the market transition literature, has ambiguous effects on labor market prospects. The parameter estimates show that experience ties workers to their current firms and reduces upward occupational mobility-both standard effects reflecting the eventual maximizing of career prospects during the work life-cycle. But experience increases internal mobility (until 18 years, when the curvilinear effect reverses) and shifts to new private firms (until 14 years). It decreases shifts to firms in low-wage branches (until 24 years). Experience initially protects from job loss, but contrary to market transition theory, as market transition progresses it eventually increases exposure to layoff.
Firm size has several effects similar to those found in the West (Carroll and Mayer 1986 ). Employment in a large firm shelters Russians from job loss, especially those with less than high school education. It lowers the odds that an interfirm shift will lead to a new private firm, possibly because most new private firms are small (and may require different skills). Larger firm size increases the odds that a shift will be to a higher-earning occupation and, for those without college, decreases the odds that a shift will be to a low-wage branch. Perhaps surprisingly, firm size has no significant effect on internal mobility. But otherwise, Russians employed in smaller firms, as increasing numbers are, face greater exposure to unfavorable labor market outcomes.
DISCUSSION
I have sought to show how and why structural change must be foregrounded in analyses of stratification under conditions of market transition. The framework posits two links in the process whereby the institutional changes of market transition affect stratification. First, prior structural conditions interact with the specific policies by which market transition is implemented to produce particular patterns of structural change in postsocialist countries. Second, these patterns of structural change affect individual-level labor market prospects-and, thus, life chances-in theoretically coherent ways.
I have developed both links based on a study of labor market transitions in post-Socialist Russia, which shows that structural factors-characteristics of employer, region of residence, and overall output levels-have strong direct effects on individual labor market transitions and also interact with human capital. Russia's market transition led to a particular pattern of dramatic changes in the marginal distributions of these structural factors: the uneven spread of private property (across firms, branches, and regions), divergent patterns of performance and employment change (across the same units), and, globally, an extended recession. These specific structural changes are no more intrinsic to market transition than is the growth experienced in China. Instead, they resulted from Russia's particular market transition policies, structural conditions, and political developments. Policies and prior conditions thus exerted a more theoretically coherent-if contextually contingent-set of effects on stratification than any generic features of market institutions as such. Just as an adequate sense of stratification processes in stable capitalist societies requires theories and research on how structural location influences life chances (Carroll and Mayer 1986 ; DiPrete and Nonnemaker 1997; Stolzenberg 1978), greater attention must be devoted to the role of structural change in shaping patterns of post-socialist stratification.
Seven of the 12 hypotheses (Hypotheses 1 through 7) derived from research on Western societies and theories of market transition pertained to the anticipated effects of structural location on particular labor market transitions. Two others (Hypotheses 9 and 10) pertained to interactions between structural location and education. With one exception, all these hypotheses received moderate to strong empirical confirmation. A "structural" control variable, firm size, also has anticipated effects. Structural location clearly affects the labor market fortunes of contemporary Russians in theoretically predictable and coherent ways.
The one exception, Hypothesis 1, is important: In Russia, private property appears not to have the firm-level effects anticipated by market reformers. There is some evidence that such effects were emerging by 1997, a possibility that must be tested with future data. But if the lack of effect stands, it will not surprise the many Russia specialists who have questioned the impact of privatization because of the particular conditions in which it has taken place (Blasi et al. 1997 ). More surprising, in light of such doubts, are the pronounced effects of privatization at branch level. Taken together, the results reinforce the message of the studies based on China, which found that the effects of property form on firm practices (such as hiring and firing) are more complex than implied by the Kornai model (Guthrie 1997; Walder 1995) .
One advantage of the structural approach is that it explicitly disentangles the effects of institutional change from the effects of structural change. The two aspects of market transition are clearly related: Institutional changes such as the introduction of private property clearly induce structural changes, and structural preconditions shape the actual consequences of those institutional changes. But institutional change and structural change are conceptually distinct, and their relationship is variable. Therefore, an adequate theoretical understanding of post-socialist stratification processes requires that they be distinguished empirically (Walder 2002) . My analysis has accomplished this at two of the three levels of structural analysis (employer and region) by including measures of the extent of privatization (institutional change) and economic performance (structural change). At the third level of structural analysis-time-it is not possible to separate these two aspects of change because they covary so strongly.
By disentangling, both conceptually and empirically, institutional and structural effects on individuals' life chances, the structural perspective on post-socialist stratification lends insight into why there cannot be universal consequences of market transition for processes generating inequality. Institutional variations and politics generate different stratification outcomes in the context of market transition because they combine with another source of variation, inherited structural legacies, to produce varying patterns of structural change in the labor market. Others have made a similar argument, based on institutional variations across post-socialist societies (Stark and Bruszt 1998; Walder 1996) Rank-and-file x (y > 0)
